

## Message Text

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S E C R E T S E C T 1 OF 4 ASUNCION 2965

STATE PASS ACDA  
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TAGS: MASS MPOL PA  
SUBJECT: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE:  
PARAGUAY

REF A) STATE 167901 B) STATE 168320 C) ASUNCION 1567  
D) STATE 182987

1. SUMMARY: A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PARAGUAY, AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OVERALL U.S. EFFORTS, IS JUSTIFIED PRIMARILY ON POLITICAL AND NATION-BUILDING GROUNDS. IT CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE LEVERAGE FOR ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS IN AREAS OTHER THAN MILITARY AND IT HAS MADE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PARAGUAY'S DEVELOPMENT. THIS FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PARAGUAY CONTAINS THE CHIEF OF MISSION'S ESTIMATE OF PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS FOR FY80, FY81 AND FY82. END SUMMARY.

2. THIS SUBMISSION IS KEYED TO PARAGRAPH 3A OF REFERENCE A:  
A. THIS IS THE FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR PARAGUAY AS OF 20 JULY 1978. IT ADDRESSES BUDGET YEAR FY80 AND TWO OUT YEARS, FY81 AND FY82.

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(1). U. S. INTERESTS: THE U. S. HAS NO DIRECT SECURITY INTEREST RELATED TO PARAGUAY. IT IS IN OUR LONG TERM REGIONAL SECURITY INTEREST TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE IN PARAGUAY. PARAGUAY'S EFFECT ON REGIONAL SECURITY STEMS FROM ITS LOCATION AS A BUFFER STATE BETWEEN RIVALS, ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL, ITS VALUE AS AN EXPORTER OF FOOD AND RAW MATERIALS AND ITS POTENTIAL HUGE

OUTPUT, IN PARTNERSHIP WITH BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA, OF HYDROELECTRIC ENERGY. OUR LONG-STANDING PROGRAM OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS JUSTIFIED PRIMARILY ON POLITICAL AND NATION-BUILDING GROUNDS, RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF PARAGUAY'S CONTRIBUTION TO U.S. MILITARY SECURITY.

OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, ORIENTED IN SUPPORT OF THE ARMED FORCES' NATION-BUILDING EFFORTS, HAS MADE A POSITIVE CONTRIBUTION TO PARAGUAY'S ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, IT HAS PROVIDED LEVERAGE FOR ADVANCING U.S. INTERESTS ACROSS THE BOARD.

THE PRESENCE OF A THREE-MAN MILITARY TEAM--THE ODC--AS A PART OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, HAS REPRESENTATIONAL AND FOREIGN POLICY UTILITY. THE PARAGUAYAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT, HEADED BY PRESIDENT (GENERAL) STROESSNER, CONSIDERS THIS PRESENCE HIGHLY DESIRABLE BECAUSE OF THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF CONTINUED MILITARY TIES TO THIS COUNTRY, WEDGED AS IT IS BETWEEN TWO POWERFUL NEIGHBORS. FURTHERMORE, THE ODC PROVIDES A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO THE INFLUENTIAL OFFICER CORPS, WHO CAN PLAY A KEY ROLE IN DEVELOPING PARAGUAY'S POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, AND IN PARAGUAY'S OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY. THUS THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND THE ODC PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL LEVER FOR THE U.S. IN SEEKING TO PROMOTE OUR MAIN POLICY OBJECTIVES OF GREATER RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, BETTER COOPERATION ON NARCOTICS MATTERS, AND CONTINUED PARAGUAYAN SUPPORT FOR THE U.S.

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IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. THE LONG LEAD TIME ASSOCIATED WITH THE DELIVERY OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES LENDS ITSELF TO THE SELECTIVE USE OF DELAYS, CANCELLATIONS, ETC. AS A TOOL TO BE USED IN FURTHERANCE OF U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS. THIS CAN BE DONE SELECTIVELY, AT VARIOUS LEVELS AND MORE THAN ONCE. THIS CANNOT BE DONE WITH PROGRAMS THAT ARE NOT FUNDED.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR PARAGUAY IS TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN TIES BETWEEN THE U. S. AND PARAGUAYAN MILITARY IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN A DEGREE OF INFLUENCE WITH THIS HIGHLY INFLUENTIAL ELEMENT IN PARAGUAYAN SOCIETY. WE ALSO PROVIDE PART OF THE WHEREWITHAL FOR PARAGUAY'S INTERNAL SECURITY AND TO DETER POSSIBLE OVERT OR COVERT ACTIONS BY HER LARGE NEIGHBORS, BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA. IMET WILL BE USED TO UPGRADE THE QUALITY OF THE OFFICER CORPS THROUGH PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND PROVIDE THE TECHNICAL TRAINING, NOT AVAILABLE IN COUNTRY, REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR NATION-BUILDING PROJECTS.

(2). THREAT PERCEIVED BY HOST COUNTRY: PARAGUAY HAS BORDERS WITH BRAZIL, ARGENTINA AND BOLIVIA. ANY EXTERNAL THREAT MUST COME THROUGH, OR FROM, ONE OF THESE NEIGHBORS. REALISTICALLY,

BECAUSE PARAGUAY WOULD NOT HAVE A CHANCE AGAINST EITHER BRAZIL OR ARGENTINA--AND ALSO BECAUSE OF HISTORIC AND EMOTIONAL REASONS-- BOLIVIA HAS BEEN CAST IN THE ROLE OF "BAD GUY" AND IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE CURRENT EXTERNAL THREAT. PARAGUAYAN STRATEGY IS FIRST TO MAINTAIN GOOD RELATIONS WITH BOTH BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA AND TO PLAY ONE OFF AGAINST THE OTHER. IN THE EVENT OF EXTERNAL ARMED INTERVENTION, PARAGUAYAN ARMED FORCES WOULD DELAY AN ENEMY ADVANCE AS LONG AS POSSIBLE, WHILE MOBILIZING AND HOPING FOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE. IF OVERRUN OR BYPASSED, INDIVIDUAL UNITS WOULD REVERT TO GUERRILLA TACTICS IN THE INTERIOR.

BEYOND THE BOLIVIAN THREAT, THERE IS PAINTED AN INDISTINCT SPECTRE OF A "COMMUNIST THREAT," SOMEWHAT ILL-DEFINED, BUT TENDING TO ENCOMPASS ANYONE WHO DOES NOT AGREE WITH THE  
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GOVERNMENT. THE MENACE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IS EXAMPLIFIED BY THE SOVIET UNION, WITH ITS GOAL OF WORLD DOMINATION UNDER COMMUNISM, AND ITS WORLD-WIDE NET OF SPIES AND AGENTS. CUBA IS SEEN AS RUSSIA'S AGENT IN LATIN AMERICA, WORKING DIRECTLY THROUGH ITS DIPLOMATIC POSTS AND INDIRECTLY THROUGH ITS SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL SUBVERSIVE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

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AS AN EXTENSION OF THIS COMMUNIST THREAT, THE GOVERNMENT OF PARAGUAY SEES A THREAT FROM THE VERY LARGE NUMBER OF PARAGUAYANS-IN-EXILE IN ARGENTINA, ALLIED TO AND SUPPORTED BY TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS IN ARGENTINA, URUGUAY, BOLIVIA, ETC, AND BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COORDINATING JUNTA. SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS GUIDED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM ARE BELIEVED TO BE LURKING BEHIND EVERY TREE. THE POLICE AND CIVIL AUTHORITY ARE SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY WITH THE MILITARY AS A BACKUP. THE LAST ARMED SUBVERSION WAS IN 1976 WHILE THE LAST INVOLVEMENT OF THE MILITARY WAS ALSO IN 1976. THERE WAS AN INCIDENT REPORTED IN JANUARY 1978, BUT THE JUDGEMENT OF THE EMBASSY IS THAT IT WAS STAGED BY THE POLICE FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL PURPOSES.

(3) THREAT PERCEIVED BY MISSION: THIS MISSION DOES NOT BELIEVE THERE IS AN EXTERNAL ARMED THREAT AS LONG AS THE GOVERNMENTS OF BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA REMAIN THE WESTERN CAMP, NOR IS THERE SEEN A THREAT OF AN INTERNAL COMMUNIST TAKEOVER SINCE EITHER OR BOTH LARGE NEIGHBORS WOULD PROBABLY INTERVENE TO PREVENT IT. THIS PLACES PARAGUAY IN THE CLASSIC POSITION OF BALANCING HER TWO NEIGHBORS AGAINST EACH OTHER FOR HER OWN SECURITY AND BENEFIT.

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THE MAIN THREAT IS PERCEIVED AS THAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY FROM PARAGUAYAN EXILES. ALTHOUGH OF ALL POLITICAL PERSUASIONS, MOSTLY DEMOCRATIC, THEY ARE ONLY LINKED BY A COMMON DISLIKE FOR THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. IF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT LOSES THE LOYALTY OF THE COMMON MAN AND IF ARGENTINA OR BRAZIL GRANT SANCTUARY OR PERMITS SUPPORT OF ANTI-GOVERNMENT ELEMENTS, THE POLICE AND ARMED FORCES WOULD BE HARD-PRESSED TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY.

(4). MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: PARAGUAY'S PRESIDENT STROESSNER IS DETERMINED TO DEVOTE NATIONAL RESOURCES TO NATION-BUILDING RATHER THAN ARMAMENT. THUS, THE PAPER ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY OF ABOUT 12,000 MEN IN 6 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, ONE CAVALRY DIVISION AND AN ESCORT REGIMENT IS MAINLY A BASE FOR MOBILIZATION AND FOR TRAINING AN ANNUAL GROUP OF CONSCRIPTS. SINCE MILITARY UNITS ARE EXPECTED TO BE SEMI SELF-SUPPORTING, BETWEEN 20 PERCENT AND 50 PERCENT OF A UNIT ARE INVOLVED DAILY IN NON-MILITARY OCCUPATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR UNIT. THE REMAINDER, AFTER A SHORT PERIOD OF BASIC TRAINING, ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MILITARY'S NATION BUILDING PROJECTS. THE ARMY HAS NO OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AND ONLY LIMITED DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST A MODERN GROUND FORCE. ITS ENTIRE STRENGTH APPROXIMATES THAT OF A U.S. INFANTRY DIVISION. IT IS SCATTERED IN SMALL POSTS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE PARAGUAYAN ARMED FORCES FORM AN INEXPENSIVE, DISCIPLINED ORGANIZATION MAINLY INVOLVED IN NATION-BUILDING PROJECTS. THE AIR FORCE HAS NO JET AIRCRAFT AND ONLY ONE AIRCRAFT

ARMED WITH MACHINE GUNS. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF THE AIR FORCE IS TO OPERATE THE NATIONAL INTERNAL AIRLINE(TAM) AND THE NATIONAL FLAG AIRLINE (LAP). TAM IS THE PRIMARY MODE OF TRAVEL INTO MANY REMOTE REGIONS OF THE COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE ROADS ARE CLOSED BECAUSE OF RAINS. THUS ALTHOUGH THE AIR FORCE IS OF NO STRATEGIC VALUE IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTNT IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT.

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THE NAVY PROVIDES A RIVERINE CAPABILITY IN THE INTERIOR OF THE COUNTRY. WITH ONLY TWO MAJOR RIVER SYSTEMS, THE NAVY IS OF NO STRATGIC IMPORTANCE. HISTORICALLY, NAVY PERSONNEL HAVE FOUGHT AS INFANTRY WHEN NEEDED. HOWEVER, IN PEACETIME, THE NAVY OPERATES THE MERCHANT MARINE, PROVIDES SECURITY FOR HYDROELECTRIC SITES ON THE PARANA RIVER AND CONTROLS THE LARGE AND INCREASING VOLUME OF RIVER TRAFFIC IN THIS LAND-LOCKED COUNTRY.

IT IS IN THE U.S. INTEREST TO MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT PARAGUAYAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO CONTINUE OR INCREASE NATION BUILDING PROJECTS,TO DETER ANY ADVENTURISM ON THE PART OF HER NEIGHBORS AS WELL AS THE CAPABILITY TO COPE WITH ANY THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY THAT SHOULD OCCUR.

THE MILITARY, BY ITS SYSTEM OF BASES AND FORTS, PROVIDES A COMMAND AND CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, MEDICAL AND LOGISTIC INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE INTERIOR WHICH CAN COMPLEMENT U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE SUPPORT PROJECTS. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN REMOTE AREAS WHICH ARE OF LITTLE INTEREST TO CIVIL OR PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS.

(6). DEFENSE SPENDING DOES NOT HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE TOTAL ECONOMY. WHAT IMPACT IT HAS IS PROBABLY SUPPORTIVE OF DEVELOPMENT, SINCE PART OF THE DEFENSE BUDGET IS DEVOTED TO PUBLIC WORKS EXPENDITURES. OVERALL DEFENSE SPENDING ACCOUNTS FOR 15.4 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL BUDGET AND LESS THAN 2 PERCENT OF THE GNP. MILITARY IMPORTS ARE SMALL AND IN NO WAY CONSTITUTE A DRAIN ON THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES. TOTAL NATIONAL DEBT SERVICE COSTS IN 1978 WILL BE ABOUT \$19 MILLION COMPARED TO EXPORT EARNINGS OF OVER \$300 MILLION AND CENTRAL BANK RESERVES OF OVER \$320 MILLION, SO THE COUNTRY HAS NO DEBT SERVICE PROBLEMS.

(7)-(9). NOT REQUIRED PER REFTTEL D.

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(10). MILITARY SALES TO PARAGUAY HAVE NO ARMS CONTROL  
IMPACT AS NO MAJOR SALES ARE LIKELY AND NO NEW CAPABILITIES  
WOULD BE INTRODUCED INTO THE REGION.

(11). WHILE PARAGUAY IS A PROBLEM COUNTRY WHERE  
HUMAN RIGHTS ARE CONCERNED, THE EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THE  
U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PROMOTES HUMAN RIGHTS HERE  
AND DOES NOT REINFORCE VIOLATIONS. THE NUMBER OF SERIOUS  
VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL ARE RELATIVELY SMALL BUT HAVE  
BEEN CHRONIC THROUGHOUT THE 24 YEARS THAT PRESIDENT STROESSNER  
HAD HELD POWER. ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY IS ONE OF THE MAIN  
PROPS OF THE STROESSNER REGIME, THE GOVERNMENT IS OSTENSIBLY  
CIVIL AND THE CONSTITUTION IS DEMOCRATIC IN FORM, IF NOT  
PRACTICE. HOWEVER, SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION HAVE BEEN  
SUSPENDED SINCE PRESIDENT STROESSNER TOOK POWER. IN THE YEARS  
SINCE, THE POLICE RATHER THAN THE MILITARY SERVICES HAVE BEEN  
THE MOST SERIOUS AND BLATANT VIOLATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INDULGING  
IN TORTURE, ABDUCTIONS AND PROLONGED DETENTIONS WITHOUT CHARGES  
OR TRIAL.

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THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN ALLOWED TO FUNCTION  
INDEPENDENTLY; THUS THERE IS NO CHECK ON POLICE ABUSES. WHILE  
THE MILITARY HAS A CLEANER RECORD IN HUMAN RIGHTS AREA,  
ITS REPUTATION IS FAR FROM UNBLEMISHED. IN RECENT YEARS, THE  
ARMY IN PARTICULAR HAS DEMONSTRATED A DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO

NATION-BUILDING WHICH PROMOTES HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS IN RURAL AREAS. IN THE LAST YEAR, PARAGUAY HAS MADE MAJOR IMPROVEMENTS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREAS, DESPITE SOME SETBACKS, SUCH AS THE ARREST THIS MONTH OF A LEADING OPPOSITION FIGURE, WHOSE CASE IS STILL PENDING. OTHERWISE, SIGNIFICANT RELEASES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE TAKEN PLACE AND THE GOVERNMENT HAS SUBMITTED NEW DETAINEES TO JUDICIAL PROCESSING MUCH MORE QUICKLY. EVIDENCE IS ACCRUING THAT GROWING NUMBERS OF PARAGUAYAN MILITARY OFFICERS RECOGNIZE THE NEED TO IMPROVE THE COUNTRY'S RECORD ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND BELIEVE GREATER DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS NEEDED. WE CANNOT QUANTIFY THESE IMPRESSIONS STATISTICALLY BUT WE BELIEVE THAT U.S. INFLUENCE OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN DEVELOPING SUCH VIEWS AMONG MILITARY OFFICERS BY MEANS OF TRAINING PROGRAMS AND BY OUR URGING THAT GREATER ATTENTION  
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BE GIVEN TO NATION-BUILDING ACTIVITIES.

(12). PARAGUAY HAS MADE NO MAJOR PURCHASES OF WAR MATERIAL DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS. MOST MAJOR COMBAT EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN ACQUIRED BY DONATION FROM BRAZIL, ARGENTINA OR THE U.S. WITHIN THE PAST FIVE YEARS PARAGUAY HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM NON-U.S. SOURCES.  
ARGENTINA: LIGHT ARTILLERY, NAVAL CRAFT, SMALL ARMS, ENGINEER EQUIPMENT, ARMORED VEHICLES, TRAINING. TOTAL VALUE: \$.3 MILLION GRANT AID.  
BRAZIL: AIRCRAFT, ENGINEER EQUIPMENT, TRAINING. TOTAL VALUE: \$1.4 MILLION GRANT AID.  
SOUTH AFRICA: ENGINEER HEAVY EQUIPMENT. TOTAL VALUE: \$3.3 MILLION CREDIT.

OTHER SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN INSIGNIFICANT BOTH AS TO AMOUNTS AND TYPES OF EQUIPMENT FURNISHED.

(13). THE COUNTRY PROGRAM RECOMMENDED FOR PARAGUAY IN FY80 IS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) LEVEL 1 (MINIMUM LEVEL)

IMET -\$200,000.

DESCRIPTION: THIS LEVEL IS CONSIDERABLY BELOW THE FY78 FUNDING OF \$600,000 AND IS APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS THAT IN THE CPD FOR FY79 OF \$150,000. THE FY79 CPD LEVEL IS CONSIDERED INADEQUATE AND WAS SUBJECT OF A REALAMA (REFTEL C). AT THIS LEVEL ONLY 6 OFFICERS COULD BE PROGRAMMED TO RECEIVE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND 8 OFFICERS TO SIMILAR CLASSES IN THE CANAL ZONE. IN ADDITION 2 OFFICERS AND 22 ENLISTED COULD BE PROGRAMMED TO ATTEND TECHNICAL, TACTICAL AND SKILL PRODUCING COURSES IN THE ANAL ZONE, WHICH ARE NOT WITHIN PARAGUAY'S CAPABILITY TO TEACH.

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RISK ASSESSMENT: THIS LEVEL IS SUFFICIENT ONLY TO MAINTAIN A MINIMUM U.S. INFLUENCE BY EXPOSING A FEW OFFICERS AND ENLISTED PERSONNEL TO U.S. THOUGHTS AND IDEALS. SINCE PARAGUAY HAS ONLY A MINIMAL TRAINING CAPABILITY AT EVERY BASEC LEVEL,SHE MUST OBTAIN TRAINING OUTSIDE OR DO WITHOUT.THIS LEVEL WILL NOT PROVIDE FOR MAINTENANCE FOR MODERNIZATION OF IN-COUNTRY TRAINING CAPABILITY, NOR WILL IT PROVIDE A U.S. ORIENTATION TOUR FOR THE GRADUATING CLASS OF THE COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE. IT IS FELT THAT ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL WOULD OFFER ADDITIONAL TRAINING AND THAT PARAGUAY MAY WELL MAKE OVERTURES TO OTHER SOUTH AMERICAN NATIONS AS WELL AS SOUTH AFRICA, WEST GERMAN, ITALY, REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND SPAIN FOR ADVANCED PROFESSIONAL AND TECHNICAL TRAINING.

FMS FINANCING - \$200,000

DESCRIPTION: THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT MINIMUM MAINTENANCE OF TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT, SOME IMPROVEMENT IN AIR NAVIGATION FACILITIES AND THE PURCHASE OF ESSENTIAL SPARE PARTS FOR U.S. SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT.

RISK ASSESSMENT: HIS LEVEL DOES NOT PERMIT PURCHASE OF CONSTRUCTION, ROAD BUILDING AND OTHER EQUIPMENT, WHICH IS VITALLY NEEDED FOR NATION-BUILDING PROJECTS, NOR DOES IT PROVIDE FOR ANY FORCE MODERNIZATION. AT SOME POINT PARAGUAY MUST REPLACE HER NOW OBSOLETE INVENTORY OF ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. WHEN THIS HAPPENS SHE WILL BE FORCED TO LOOK TO OTHER NATIONS FOR FINANCING AND SALES, FURTHER REDUCING U.S. INFLUENCE.

THE FAILURE TO APPROVE THIS MINIMUM LEVEL PROGRAM WOULD ELIMINATE THE RATIONALE FOR AN ODC AND REDUCE THE U.S.'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE PARAGUAYAN MILITARY. IN TURN, THE MILITARY WILL BE LESS LIKELY TO ACCEPT AND SUPPORT THE U.S. POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS. ALSO, INCREASING THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS TRAINED IN ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL INCREASES THE NUMBER EXPOSED TO VIEWS WHICH ARE USUALLY OPPOSED TO THOSE OF THE U.S., PARTICULARLY IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA.

(B) LEVEL 2 (INTERMEDIATE LEVEL).

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IMET - \$250,000

DESCRIPTION: THIS VERY MODEST INCREASE WOULD PROVIDE ADDITIONAL PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION FOR ENGINEERING/LOGISTIC PERSONNEL AND SOME TRAINING MATERIALS FOR IN-COUNTRY TRAINING.

RISK ASSESSMENT: THIS WILL NOT PROVIDE THE NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALLY TRAINED OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS



REQUIRED BY PARAGUAYAN ARMED FORCES TO REPLACE ANNUAL LOSSES TO CIVILIAN LIFE. SHORTAGES WILL OCCUR IN ENGINEERING, LOGISTICS, MAINTENANCE AND TRANSPORT AREAS. THIS WILL REDUCE THE MILITARY'S ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH ITS MISSION. THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING WILL BE REQUIRED.

FMS FINANCING - \$400,000

THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT LIMITED PURCHASE OF COMMUNICATION, MEDICAL HEAVY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT, SPARE PARTS AND SPECIAL PURPOSE VEHICLES. IT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR SUPPORT IN THE AREAS OF SMALL ARMS, MODERNIZATION OF AIRCRAFT, RIVER CRAFT OR GROUND FORCES.

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(C) LEVEL 3 (CURRENT LEVEL).

IMET - \$400,000

THIS LEVEL WOULD PERMIT THOSE OFFICERS WHO ARE EARMARKED AND QUALIFIED FOR FOREIGN PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION TO RECEIVE THIS TRAINING IN THE U.S. IN ADDITION, SUFFICIENT TRAINED TECHNICIANS WILL BE PROVIDED TO REPLACE THOSE REACHING THE END OF THEIR MILITARY SERVICE AND ENTERING CIVILIAN LIFE.

THE FUNDING LEVEL WILL PERMIT A MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MILITARY, OF ALL SERVICES, TO BE EXPOSED TO U.S. VALUES, IDEALS AND TRADITIONS AND CONVERSELY REDUCE THOSE EXPOSED TO OTHER POINTS OF VIEW.

FMS FINANCING \$ \$800,000

FINANCING OF \$300,000 APPROVED FOR FY78 WAS NOT ADVANCED BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS. FY 79 PROPOSES \$500,000 WHICH

MAY BE LOST. THEREFORE, THIS LEVEL WOULD SATISFY THE ENTIRE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM FOR FY80 BY ALLOWING SUFFICIENT CREDIT TO PURCHASE ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT, ROAD BUILDING MACHINERY, VEHICLES AND MAINTENENCE QUIPMENT FOR ALL SERVICES.

ALTHOUGH FINANCING IS ALLOCATED TO MILITARY UNITS, ALMOST  
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ALL FINANCING WOULD BE USED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FOR CIVIC ACTION OR NATION-BUILDING PROJECTS, IN PREFERENCE TO WEAPONS MONDERNIZATION.

(D) THERE ARE NO KNOWN INITIATIVES WHICH WOULD REQUIRE FUNDING ABOVE THE CURRENT LEVELS.THE EXPANDING PARAGUAYAN ECONOMY SHOULD EASILY ABSORB PROGRAM INCREASES DUE TO INFLATION.

(E) ADDRESSED IN SUBPARAGRAPH (A)-(C) ABOVE.

(F) PRESENT MANNING OF THE OFFICE OF DEFENSE COOPERATION OF 3 OFFICERS, 2 U.S. CIVILIANS AND 4 LWR IS REQUIRED AT THE MINIMUM LEVEL TO PERFORM THE LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION FOR MAP EQUIPMENT ON HAND AND IN THE PIPELINE, AS WELL AS TO ADMINISTER THE IMET PROGRAM AND TO PROVIDE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE FOR FMS.

NO INCREASE IN MANNING WOULD BE REQUIRED AT LEVEL 2 OR 3. ADDITIONAL WORKLOAD CAN BE ABSORBED OR OVERLOAD HANDLED BY ASSISTANCE TEAMS OR STAFF VISITS.

(G) NOT APPLICABLE - STARTS WITH 1979 SUBMISSION.

(H)" " " " " "

(I) IT IS OUR BEST ESTIMATE THAT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FY81 AND FY82 WILL BE AT A LEVEL OF \$400,000 FOR IMET AND \$500,000 OF FMS FINANCING. MAP IS NOT AUTHORIZED. AT THESE LEVELS WE GET THE MOST FOR OUR DOLLARS IN IMET. PART OF THE IMPACT OF THIS PROGRAM RESULTS FROM EXPOSURE TO THE U.S., ITS PEOPLE AND IDEALS. RESULTS ARE FAR MORE THAN CAN BE QUANTIFIED SOLELY BY THE TRAINING RECEIVED. IN ADDITION, ITS EFFECTS ARE LONGLASTING. FMS FINANCING IS AT NOCOST TO THE U.S. AND ASSURES US CONTROL OVER WHAT IS PURCHASED AS WELL AS  
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PROVIDING A TOOL TO SUPPORT OUR OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.  
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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 jan 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 21 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Executive Order:** GS  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Expiration:**  
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**From:** ASUNCION  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1978/newtext/t19780735/aaaabdm.tel  
**Line Count:** 547  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 9bfb146f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ACTION PM  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 10  
**Previous Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** 78 STATE 167901, 78 STATE 168320, 78 ASUNCION 1567  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 apr 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1931878  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE: PARAGUAY  
**TAGS:** MASS, MPOL, PINR, PA  
**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/9bfb146f-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014